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Abstract 
Having reviewed 91 information security (InfoSec) 
studies published in top IS journals for a ten-year period 
(2004-2014), we discuss technical, behavioral, 
financial, and managerial challenges for CIOs and 
boards of directors, and offer suggestions for future 
practice-relevant research on preventing, preparing 
for, detecting and responding to InfoSec incidents. 
   
1. Introduction  
 
The SIM 2015 IT Trends Study lists Security as the 
third highest IS investment priority (after Data Analytics 
and ERP) -- a sharp rise from #14 in 2013. 
Organizations daily confront InfoSec risks from 
malicious parties who steal data, intellectual property, 
and user credentials; harm software or data quality; and 
introduce malicious code that can cause systems to fail. 
Careless behavior by employees, customers, and 
partners also cause systems to fail or make it easier for 
attackers to compromise corporate systems and data. 
InfoSec incidents can damage an organization’s 
reputation and financial health. Many attacks propagate 
both within and across organizations (via distributed 
denial of service attacks, exchange of malicious code in 
emails or social media, and other mechanisms). IT 
professionals, working under the direction of the CIO, 
try to prevent InfoSec incidents, prepare for events that 
will occur anyway (100% prevention is impossible), 
detect incidents that do occur, and rapidly and 
effectively respond to reduce negative impacts to 
organizations and their customers and business partners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Phases of InfoSec Activities 
 
     Prior reviews [1] [2] find that behavioral, technical, 
organizational and other factors combine to affect Info-
Sec preparation and compliance. A meta-review of 1280 
papers notes that few relied on empirical research [3]. 
Another meta-review [4] reports that econometric 
models and attitude surveys prevail and that research 
with a stronger managerial focus is needed. Here, we 
discuss 91 empirical papers published over a ten year 
period (see Appendix 1) in the AIS Senior Scholars 
Basket of journals (EJIS, JAIS, JIT, JMIS, JSIS, ISJ, 
ISR, MISQ), including key findings and implications for 
the CIO and boards of directors. Our review method and 
justification are explained in the earlier meta-review [4]. 
Employees are a “weak link” in InfoSec [5], [6], and 
behavioral research seeks to understand why users fail 
to comply with InfoSec policies and guidelines. Despite 
efforts to test and strengthen General Deterrence Theory 
(GDT) and to combine it with theories of neutralization 
and organizational justice [7] [8] “weak-link” research 
reveals that organizations cannot expect employees, 
partners or customers to behave optimally. Humans are 
fallible; even with the best of intentions users take short 
cuts or fall prey to phishing and other social engineering 
attacks. Thus, both organizational InfoSec policies and 
practice-based research need to move beyond 
prevention, and focus at least as much on helping 
organizations effectively prepare for, detect and respond 
to the breaches that will inevitably occur. 
The CIO answers to the board of directors on 
strategic IS governance issues, including InfoSec 
challenges. Boards are advised to annually review and 
critique their organization’s IT security practices and 
disaster-recovery capabilities, and to stay abreast of best 
practices [9]. We examine these concerns through two 
lenses: topics (technical, behavioral, managerial) and 
security emphasis (prevent, prepare, detect, respond).  
 
Author Note: Appendix 1 cites 91 papers comprising our 
review. To reference papers that were NOT part of the 
review set, we use numbered citations (HICSS format). To 
reference the 91 empirical papers in the review set, we use 
APA (Author, date) form. Also, in the sections that follow 
we provide a table listing the specific papers discussed in 
that section, in chronological order of publication. 
Prevent 
Prepare 
Incident 
 
Respond Detect 
before incident 
during and/or shortly after an incident 
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 2. InfoSec Risks and Impacts  
Table 1 InfoSec Risks and Impacts Articles 
Author/s Journal Year Primary Aim  
Cavusoglu et al. ISR 2005 Detect 
Cavusoglu et al. JMIS 2008 Prevent 
Cremonini and Nizovtsev JMIS 2009 Prevent 
Dey et al. JMIS 2012 Prevent 
Galbreth and Shor MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Goldstein et al. JAIS 2011 Impacts 
Gordon et al. MISQ 2010 Impacts 
Hua and Bapna JSIS 2013 Prevent 
Kumar et al. JMIS 2008 Prevent 
Mookerjee et al. ISR 2011 Detect 
Png and Wang JMIS 2009 Prevent 
Png et al JMIS 2008 Prevent 
Ransbotham and Mitra ISR 2009 Detect 
Wang et al. ISR 2008 Prevent 
Wang et al. ISR 2013 Prevent 
Yayla & Hu JIT 2011 Impacts 
 
With increases in attacks in recent years, boards 
need frequent updates from the CIO on incidents, 
standards, and challenges in their particular industries. 
In this section we review risk assessment studies that 
yield guidance for InfoSec investment decisions. These 
studies reveal that no one-size-fits-all rule answers the 
question of how much to spend on InfoSec, nor how to 
prioritize investments in specific tools or processes.  
One research stream helps managers estimate the 
financial impacts of attacks. Rare high-cost incidents 
can distort managers’ subsequent loss estimates, but 
combining daily loss (value-at-risk) data with extreme 
value analysis produces more accurate loss estimates 
(Wang et al. 2008). And, a test of a resource weaknesses 
framework [10] reveals that those InfoSec incidents that 
decrease IS resource availability (such as by shutting 
down a system or rendering data unavailable) cause 
greater financial losses than those which compromise 
data quality (Goldstein et al. 2011).  
One theory suggests that disclosing investments in 
InfoSec tools/controls deters attackers (Cavusoglu et al. 
2005). Penalties imposed by law enforcement also aim 
to deter future attackers (Cavusoglu et al. 2008), but this 
form of deterrence is not always effective, because well-
informed attackers just shift their operations to countries 
with lower cybercrime conviction rates (Png et al. 
2008). One paper suggests that higher-value firms (more 
attractive targets) should spend more to defend against 
malicious attacks, and enforcement agencies should 
focus on high-value targets (Png and Wang 2009).  
Some attackers conduct reconnaissance before 
strategically choosing targets (Ransbotham and Mitra 
2009), although one study finds that attackers derive 
little benefit from knowing whether a particular target 
has very strong or very weak protection (Mookerjee et 
al. 2011). A layered “defense-in-depth” security config-
uration contains controls that act as strategic substitutes, 
blocking attacks upstream (Kumar et al. 2008). Such 
layered controls might also deter attackers by signaling 
that an organization is committed to protecting its’ IS 
resources (Cremonini and Nizovtsev 2010).  
Do InfoSec-related disclosures influence 
companies’ market value? InfoSec investment 
disclosures apparently do positively impact stock price 
(especially for e-commerce companies), but incident 
disclosures in annual reports do not (Gordon et al. 
2010). One study based on the efficient market 
hypothesis also reports that InfoSec incident disclosures 
impact e-commerce firm stock prices more than brick-
and-mortar firms, but increases in incident frequency 
lead to reduced market reaction intensity (Yayla and Hu, 
2011). Also, disclosure of risk mitigation efforts is 
positively received by the market, and might lead to 
fewer subsequent security incidents (Wang et al. 2013). 
However, a firm that signals that it has invested in 
preventive InfoSec controls is not likely to deter a cyber-
terrorist (Hua and Bapna 2013). A cyber-terrorist aims 
to destroy specific targets’ IS resources for political 
reasons rather than personal gain. Some cyber-terrorists 
spend years researching targets, and generally they 
attack fewer organizations than cybercriminals.  
What about InfoSec vulnerabilities in commercial 
software? This is a growing concern as organizations 
switch from custom software to off-the-shelf software 
products. When producers spend to develop new 
product features (for differentiation), they might spend 
loss on product security. Some attackers thus optimize 
their gains by targeting differentiated software products 
with large installed bases (Galbreth and Shor 2010). 
Generally, opportunistic and strategic attacker behavior 
influences security product effectiveness, ultimately 
affecting vendor prices (Dey et al. 2012).  
 
3. Technical InfoSec Research 
Table 2 Technical InfoSec Articles 
Author/s Journal Year Primary Aim  
Abbasi et al. MISQ 2010 Detect 
Cavusoglu et al. ISR 2009 Detect 
D'Aubeterre et al. JAIS 2008(a) Prevent 
D’Aubeterre et al. EJIS 2008(b) Prevent 
Fernandez-Medina, et al. EJIS 2007 Detect 
Garfinkel et al. ISR 2007 Prevent 
Li & Sarkar ISR 2006 Prevent 
Li and Sarkar ISR 2011 Prevent 
Li and Sarkar MISQ 2014 Prevent 
Melville and McQuaid ISR 2012 Prevent 
Oetzel and Spiekermann EJIS 2014 Prevent 
Siponen et al. JAIS 2006 Prevent 
Wong et al. ISJ 2012 Detect 
Yue and Cakanyildirim JMIS 2007 Detect 
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 Designing and implementing the organization’s 
InfoSec architecture is another important CIO concern. 
Each element must be assessed on its own and also in 
conjunction with each other element, to ensure that 
organizations neither over- nor under-invest in InfoSec 
capabilities and tools (Cavusoglu et al. 2009). Design 
science research investigates how to incorporate 
security elements into systems during development, or 
how to design specific tools for protecting hardware, 
software, and data. Each technique discussed next 
purports to prevent InfoSec breaches by incorporating 
protective features into systems or databases as they are 
designed. For example, a Systems Design Theory 
(Siponen et al. 2006) specifies six general requirements: 
 
1. Develop security features that resist … threats …. 
2. Reflect customer’s security requirements. 
3. Provide abstract representation and operations for 
specifying three essential elements -- threats, objects 
and security features -- for three levels of abstraction – 
organizational, conceptual, technical. 
4. Integrate SIS to normal ISD 
5. Enable the autonomy of developers. 
6. Adapt to forthcoming ISD methods. 
 
Security of a multidimensional data warehouse can 
be improved via a UML-based Access Control and 
Audit model (Fernandez-Medina et al. 2007), and 
information sharing can benefit from a Semantic 
Approach to Secure Collaborative Inter-Organizational 
eBusiness Processes (SSCIOBP; D’Aubeterre et al. 
2008b) and Secure Activity Resource Coordination 
model (SARC; D’Aubeterre et al. 2008a). A systematic 
“privacy by design” problem representation structure 
supports analysis of shared-data privacy requirements 
(Oetzel and Spiekermann 2014).  
Attackers use various techniques to reconstruct 
personally-identifiable information from redacted data 
sets. Addressing this problem, new ways to protect 
shared data have been proposed, such as random pertur-
bation techniques for swapping data values (Li and 
Sarkar 2006; Li and Sarkar 2011; Melville and McQuaid 
2012; Li and Sarkar 2014) and other statistical obfusca-
tion techniques (Garfinkel et al. 2007). 
Since 100% incident prevention is not possible, how 
can CIOs ensure that their organizations accurately, 
completely, and cost-effectively detect breaches early 
enough to limit harm from them? One paper, noting that 
intrusion detection system false alarms are expensive 
and disruptive, used a dynamic model to reveal “a trade-
off between rapid reaction and high accuracy” (Yue and 
Cakanyildirim 2007 p. 350). To improve detection of 
fake web sites, organizations can also apply statistical 
learning theory (Abbasi et al. 2010) or develop an 
“artificial immune system” (Wong et al. 2012).  
 
4. Behavioral InfoSec Research  
Table 3 Behavioral InfoSec Articles 
Author/s Journal Year Primary Aim  
Anderson and Agarwal MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Boss et al. EJIS 2009 Prevent 
Bulgurcu et al. MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Chen et al. JMIS 2012 Prevent 
D’Arcy et al. ISR 2009 Prevent 
D’Arcy, Herath, Shoss JMIS 2014 Prevent 
Dinev and Hu JAIS 2007 Prevent 
Dinev et al. ISJ 2009 Prevent 
Goel and Chengalur-Smith JSIS 2010 Prevent 
Guo et al. JMIS 2011 Prevent 
Hedstrom et al. JSIS 2011 Prevent 
Herath and Rao EJIS 2009 Prevent 
Herath et al. ISJ 2014 Prevent 
Hsu EJIS 2009 Prevent 
Johnston and Warkentin MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Karjalainen and Siponen JAIS 2011 Prevent 
Keith et al. JAIS 2009 Prevent 
Lee and Larsen EJIS 2009 Prevent 
Li et al. ISJ 2014 Prevent 
Liang and Xue JAIS 2010 Prevent 
Liang et al. ISR 2014 Prevent 
Myyry et al. EJIS 2009 Prevent 
Posey et al. MISQ 2013 Prevent 
Puhakainen and Siponen MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Siponen and Vance MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Tow et al. JIT 2010 Prevent 
Vaast JSIS 2007 Holistic 
Vance et al JAIS 2014 Prevent 
Vance et al. JMIS 2013 Detect 
Warkentin et al. EJIS 2011 Prevent 
Wright and Marett JMIS 2010 Prevent 
Wright et al. ISR 2014 Prevent 
Zhang et al. EJIS 2009 Prevent 
 
     Many studies attempt to help organizations prevent 
breaches by improving user compliance with InfoSec 
policies (such as requiring use of strong passwords, 
restrictions on access to particular databases and 
software applications, and adherence to rules governing 
sharing of confidential data). A large body of work 
examined whether and to what extent users can be 
deterred from engaging in prohibited behaviors. Other 
studies challenged General Deterrence Theory (which 
proposes that penalty certainty, severity, and swiftness 
deters users from violating policies), and some studies 
enhanced GDT by incorporating factors addressed in 
other theories.  Because GDT has received only weak or 
partial support, recent studies combined GDT with 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [11], [12]. PMT 
proposes that two cognitive processes -- threat appraisal 
(threat severity, likelihood) and coping appraisal 
(efficacy of countermeasures and ability and cost to use 
them) -- influence individuals’ attitudes about risks and 
risky behaviors. Studies demonstrate that coping 
appraisal influences employees’ intentions to comply 
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 with InfoSec rules, but that threat appraisal apparently 
does not improve user compliance -- perhaps because 
people underestimate risk likelihood and severity 
(Herath and Rao 2009). A PMT extension -- TTAT 
(Technology Threat Avoidance Theory) -- states that one 
first judges the likelihood of an attack, then judges one’s 
ability to cope with it (Dinev and Hu 2007). TTAT 
predicted college students’ use of anti-spyware software 
in a study that also concluded that avoidance and 
adoption are not polar opposites (Liang and Xue 2010). 
TTAT was subsequently integrated with the Technology 
Adoption Model (TAM) (Herath et al. 2014). A study 
that applied PMT to executive decision making found 
that IS expertise and industry IT focus influence 
executives’ appraisal processes when making decisions 
about anti-malware software (Lee and Larsen 2009).  
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) [13] states 
that beliefs influence intentions, which influence 
behavior. Reserach  that incorporated TPB reveals that 
users view protective security software (e.g., anti-virus 
software) differently than productivity software (such as 
spreadsheets). Self-efficacy and perceived ease of use, 
which influence acceptance and use of productivity 
software, does not significantly influence security 
software use. Policy “mandatoriness” also influences 
user compliance (Boss et al. 2009).  
A Theory of Accountability [14] proposes that 
individuals feel pressure to justify their attitudes and 
behaviors to others. One study finds that audit logs 
influence user compliance with InfoSec rules, through 
four influential aspects: identifiability, user awareness 
of logging and of audits, and electronic presence (Vance 
et al. 2013). Rewards also influence compliance 
attitudes (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Liang et al. 2014), and 
research also suggests that users are more receptive to 
messages emphasizing positive outcomes of compliance 
(Anderson and Agarwal 2010), rather than negative 
outcomes of non-compliance (fear appeals). However, 
(which proposes that penalty certainty, severity, and 
swiftness deters users from violating policies) 
combining social influence and self-efficacy with a 
message that consequences of non-compliance will be 
severe did predict user compliance in one study 
(Johnston and Warkentin 2010). Building on these prior 
studies, a Composite Behavior Model (Guo et al. 2011) 
proposes that users’ InfoSec compliance intentions are 
influenced by attitudes, habit, expected rewards or 
punishments, identity, and others’ disapproval or 
approval of specific behavior. Alternatively, a Theory of 
Protection-Motivated Behavior Diversity (Posey et al. 
2013) proposes that individuals judge protective 
behaviors along three main dimensions: difficulty, 
degree of criticality, and common sense.  
Experiments have yielded particularly intriguing 
findings. One experiment compared rewards (positive 
control) versus deterrence (non-compliance penalties), 
revealing a strong relationship between rewards and 
compliance and a strong interaction effect between 
reward and punishment (Chen et al. 2012). Another 
experiment (Vance et al. 2014) measured electrical 
activity (EEG) in sections of subjects’ brains associated 
with risk-taking. Before a simulated incident, subjects’ 
surveyed behavior intentions did not correlate with EEG 
readings. After the incident, subjects’ threat assessment 
survey answers did correlate with EEG readings. 
Another experiment studied why some users fall victim 
to security attacks such as phishing. Computer self-
efficacy, prior experience with computer attacks, 
security awareness, and general suspicion of humanity 
were significantly associated with subjects’ ability to 
resist “phishy” e-mails, while perceived risk of attack 
was not (Wright and Marett 2010). Another experiment 
showed that the following attacker influence techniques 
increase users’ vulnerability to phishing: “liking,” social 
proof, scarcity, reciprocity (Wright et al. 2014).  
     Why don’t employees just do the “right” thing 
(comply with safe computing rules)? A study of anti-
spyware usage in the US versus South Korea (Dinev et 
al. 2009) suggests that national culture influences 
compliance, and regardless of national culture, 
employees are also influenced by social norms. In some 
contexts, non-compliance with security rules is seen as 
morally acceptable; in such contexts perceived certainty 
of getting caught influences user compliance. In 
contexts where violations are seen as reprehensible, 
penalty severity has a stronger effect (D’Arcy et al. 
2009). Users are more likely to engage in risky 
behaviors when expected benefits are high (Tow et al. 
2010). A study that combined theories of Moral 
Development [15] and Motivational Types of Values 
[16] reports no significant relationship between users’ 
moral values and their attitudes toward InfoSec 
practices (Myyry et al. 2009). Another study (D’Arcy et 
al. 2014) combined Coping Theory [17] and Moral 
Disengagement Theory [18] to propose that conflict 
between individuals’ values and organizations’ policies 
leads employees to rationalize their policy violations. 
Studies testing Neutralization Theory [19] find that 
wrongdoers rationalize (“neutralize”) their bad behavior 
via five techniques: denial of responsibility, denial of 
injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of 
condemners, appeal to higher loyalties. A large-scale 
survey found no relationship between penalties and 
compliance intentions (thus, did not support GDT), but 
strong support for Neutralization Theory in explaining 
non-compliance intentions (Siponen and Vance 2010). 
Lastly, employees’ beliefs about procedural, 
interpersonal, informational, and distributive justice 
[20] may more strongly influence InfoSec compliance 
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 intention than certainty or severity of non-compliance 
penalties (Li et al. 2014). 
Other behavioral studies analyzed how users interact 
with specific InfoSec tools. For example, although  
strong passwords help prevent unauthorized system 
access, many people avoid using them due to difficulty 
recalling multiple passwords for different systems with 
varied password complexity rules (Zhang et al. 2009). A 
study reveals that well-chosen passphrases, based on 
longer sentences are easier for users to remember and 
use (Keith et al. 2009). Hypothesizing that the clarity of 
a written InfoSec policy affects user comprehension (in 
turn influencing whether and to what extent the policy 
is effective) Goel and Chengalur-Smith (2010) asked 68 
graduate students to rate InfoSec policies per 22 
rhetorical clarity measures. Other studies reveal that 
InfoSec awareness training is more effective when it is 
seen as personally relevant, taps into learners’ 
systematic cognitive information processing, and takes 
into account each learner’s existing knowledge 
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). Top management 
support influences employee compliance, and informal 
knowledge distribution (per Social Learning Theory and 
distinct from formal training methods) influences 
employee perceived self-efficacy, ultimately increasing 
InfoSec policy compliance (Warkentin et al. 2011). See 
also Karjalainen and Siponen (2011).  
Exploratory case studies directly examined users’ 
attitudes and behaviors. Vaast (2007) observes that 
specific work practices affect InfoSec programs, and 
that a security awareness initiative is more effective 
when customized for each work group. A longitudinal 
case study of two hospitals (Hedström et al. 2011) 
demonstrated further support for Vaast’s Social 
Representations [21] perspective, and challenged GDT 
by arguing that organizations should link user values to 
InfoSec rules, rather than relying on strict rules and 
penalties. Another case study used Frames Analysis 
(assumptions, interpretations, expectations, knowledge) 
to reveal that specific work practices, routines, and 
InfoSec attitudes at a Taiwanese firm influenced 
employees’ awareness and compliance (Hsu 2009).  
     To summarize behavioral InfoSec research from the 
perspective of the CIO and Board of Directors: we 
cannot reliably deter problematic behavior. Some 
papers conclude that deterrence is not effective and/or 
that rewards and context-specific training are more 
powerful than penalties. Educational campaigns that 
change employees’ understanding, attitudes, and work 
practices might reduce InfoSec violations and help 
prevent breaches or mistakes – if training is aligned with 
workgroup practices, formal and informal norms, and 
individuals’ prior knowledge. More behavioral research 
is needed to yield clear results that can guide 
management practice, but to date the best managerial 
advice emerging from this InfoSec stream is: reward 
good behavior, penalize rule violations, offer training 
that helps each user recognize how his/her behavior can 
weaken or strengthen the information security chain. 
Above all, do not rely on fallible human users. 
In our set of 40 behavioral studies, most aimed to 
help organizations prevent InfoSec breaches by 
inducing employees to adhere to required practices. 
While prevention is certainly an important aim, it is not 
enough. The CIO and board would benefit from studies 
that reveal how employees actually do prepare for the 
InfoSec incidents that will inevitably occur (such as by 
participating in contingency planning and “fire drills”), 
and to what extent employees make use of tools and 
information sources that detect suspicious behavior or 
potentially damaging breaches. Leaders also need to 
know how employees actually respond when incidents 
occur. For example, to what extent do they refer to and 
follow the contingency plan? To what extent do they 
improvise their responses? What specific employee 
behaviors contribute to effective and rapid response that 
minimizes harm to customers, other partners, fellow 
employees, and valuable financial, IT, and data assets? 
Conversely, what specific employee behaviors impede 
effective InfoSec incident response? 
We also note that many papers (23 of 40 behavioral 
studies in our review set) relied on attitude surveys and 
did not observe or directly measure user behavior. Given 
that employees are a weak link in the information 
security chain, it is problematic that just three behavioral 
studies were based on case research exploring employee 
attitudes and behavior in specific work contexts. Well-
designed case studies contribute important findings by 
revealing how social context and work practices interact 
with employee attitudes, intentions, and behavior.  
 
5. Managerial InfoSec Research  
 
Table 4 (below) summarizes the managerial InfoSec 
papers in our review set. Some studies directly focused 
on security policies and practices that managers set and 
oversee, and some studies considered the InfoSec 
implications of new end-user technologies. For 
example, a study guided by Control Theory [22] 
concludes that new wireless network security 
mechanisms should be coupled with workflow changes 
and policies for acceptable wireless systems use (Katos 
and Adams, 2005). An action research study in a 
multinational firm used a Bayesian evidential reasoning 
approach to perform a cost-benefit risk analysis that 
accounted for uncertainty (Sun et al. 2006). An 
intriguing content analysis of 400,000+ searches in file 
sharing networks (Johnson 2008) demonstrates that 
mobile device use increases the risk that a firm’s 
confidential data will be compromised. At greatest risk: 
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 large, highly visible firms with many retail accounts, 
and firms that experienced prior data losses. Analysis of 
an organization’s e-mail and spam data validated a 
Bayesian real options model (Herath and Herath 2008), 
and another risk assessment method combined five 
financial metrics (labor cost, lost profit, information 
asset value, business process cost, stock price) with 
qualitative risks (systems, systems security, 
information, business, shareholders) (Salmela 2008). 
Table 4 Managerial InfoSec Articles 
Author/s Journal Year Primary Aim  
Arora et al. ISR 2010 Prevent 
August and Tunca ISR 2008 Prevent 
August et al. ISR 2014 Prevent 
Backhouse et al. MISQ 2006 Prevent 
Chen, et al. MISQ 2011 Prevent 
Culnan and Williams MISQ 2009 Prevent 
Dhillon and Torkzsedeh ISJ 2006 Holistic 
Gal-Or & Ghose ISR 2005 Prepare 
Gupta and Zhdanov MISQ 2012 Prevent 
Herath and Herath JMIS 2008 Prevent 
Hsu et al. ISR 2012 Prevent 
Hu et al. JSIS 2007 Prevent 
Hui et al. JMIS 2013 Prevent 
Johnson JMIS 2008 Prevent 
Katos and Adams JSIS 2005 Prevent 
Kim and Kim MISQ 2014 Prevent 
Kwon and Johnson JMIS 2013 Prevent 
Kwon and Johnson MISQ 2014 Prevent 
Lee et al. ISR 2013 Prevent 
Njenga and Brown EJIS 2012 Respond 
Ransbotham et al. MISQ 2012 Detect 
Salmela JIT 2008 Impacts 
Smith et al. MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Spears and Barki MISQ 2010 Prevent 
Stahl et al. ISJ 2012 Prevent 
Sun et al. JMIS 2006 Impacts 
Temizkan et al. JMIS 2012 Prevent 
Zhao et al. JMIS 2013 Impacts 
 
Other research yields guidance for managerial 
oversight of information security. A study based on 
more than 100 interviews (Dhillon and Torkzadeh  
2006) identified nine “value-focused” objectives 
essential for managing information security:  
 
1. Enhance management development practices.  
2. Strengthen human resource management practices.  
3. Develop and sustain an ethical environment.  
4. Maximize access controls.  
5. Promote individual work ethic.  
6. Maximize data integrity. 
7. Enhance integrity of business processes.  
8. Maximize privacy. 
9. Maximize organizational integrity.  
 
Analysis of a national software vulnerability 
database suggests that adoption of diverse software 
configurations/versions reduces risk across a network of 
organizations, whereas (ironically) adoption of security 
standards or best practices increases risk. This is 
because a standard configuration will share common 
vulnerabilities, leading to “correlated failures,” in which 
attackers identify a weakness in one organization’s 
standard implementation and exploit it in others, 
compromising an entire network (Chen et al. 2011). 
Focusing on privacy implications of information 
security, breaches at TJX and Choicepoint were 
compared through the lens of Normative Ethics, and 
leaders are advised to focus on three objectives: create a 
culture of privacy, ensure accountability, avoid 
decoupling of InfoSec practices and policies (Culnan 
and Williams 2009). Emphasizing employees as 
partners rather than “weak link,” another study, guided 
by a Buy-in Theory of Participation [23] and Emergent 
Interactions Theory [24], concludes that InfoSec 
controls are more effective when users help to prioritize, 
analyze, design, implement, test, and monitor them 
(Spears and Barki 2010).  
Institutional Theory [25] was tested in a study of 
how and why one large company adopted various 
security policies, practices, and technologies (Hu et al. 
2007; Hsu et al. 2012). Coercion (laws and regulations) 
and norms (social influence by opinion leaders) were 
influential, but imitation (of other firms’ policies, 
practices or technology choices) was not. Senior 
management support and employee awareness report-
edly contribute to successful InfoSec management.  
A case study at the UK National Health Service 
(Stahl et al. 2012) finds that senior management support 
and ideology influenced the creation of security 
policies. However, vague InfoSec policies and those 
based on unfamiliar language left the Health Service 
open to varied interpretations, which limited their 
effectiveness in guiding or controlling behavior. 
Another case study, of five large multinational 
companies in South Africa, finds that during early 
response to an InfoSec incident, improvisation 
improved effectiveness -- presumably by bridging “un-
avoidable gaps between formal standards/procedures 
and emergent events” (Njenga and Brown 2012).  
Does security compliance maturity matter? Archival 
data from 250 health care organizations reveals that in 
those with mature certified security programs, managers 
express interest in protecting data, and tend to view 
breaches as evidence of security program failure (Kwon 
and Johnson 2013). A survey (Kwon and Johnson 2014) 
finds that investments in prevention significantly reduce 
data breaches, and that organizational learning mediates 
InfoSec investment and security performance, 
especially in the presence of external pressures. 
Combining the theories of Threat Disclosure 
Benefits and Resource Complements, a study of inter-
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 organizational information sharing (Gal-Or and Ghose 
2005) proposes that large organizations in highly 
competitive industries have strong incentives to share 
information about InfoSec vulnerabilities, threats, and 
attacks. A test of Learning Theory (Kim and Kim 2014) 
finds that prior software development experience helps 
a software firm produce anti-virus products that are able 
to rapidly detect malware. Prior experience with many 
software products helps developers produce malware 
detection products for the general public, but within-
family experience is more effective for developing 
products for detecting targeted attacks.  
Large vendors and open source vendors reportedly 
release security patches faster than smaller vendors, 
patches are released more quickly for vulnerabilities that 
represent higher threat severity, and public disclosure by 
third parties causes vendors to release patches more 
quickly (Arora 2010). Analysis of patch release 
behavior through the well-known information quality 
categories of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
[26] reveals that patches addressing confidentiality or 
integrity risks are released faster than patches 
addressing availability risks (Temizkan et al. 2012).  
Legislative pressure might lead vendors to release 
patches more quickly, and release timing also depends 
on whether a vendor has a policy of distributing fixes 
only in new software releases or is in the habit of 
releasing frequent updates. Also, compared with open 
disclosure, vulnerabilities disclosed through a market 
mechanism reportedly take longer to be exploited and 
are exploited less often (Ransbotham et al. 2012). 
Pirated software is a special case; should legitimate 
producers give patches to illegitimate users? One study 
demonstrated that software vendors receive higher 
profits when they provide security patches to users of 
illegally obtained software (August and Tunca 2008).  
Use of a managed security service provider (MSSP) 
can give rise to “system interdependency risks” (Hui et 
al. 2012). This can happen if the MSSP configures its 
software to conform to standards and best practices 
(leading to correlated failure risk, which increases along 
with growth of the customer base). Use of an MSSP may 
also give rise to a double moral hazard (lack of caution 
when risk is transferred to another organization), 
particularly if the MSSP is not transparent about its 
security practices or is averse to investing in security 
measures not deemed absolutely necessary to protect 
their clients. A proposed optimal solution is for the 
MSSP to offer multilateral contracts, specifying that if 
any one client experiences a security incident, the MSSP 
will compensate all clients (Lee it al. 2013). Cyber-
insurance might be a better way to reduce risk than 
transferring risk to an MSSP or entering into a risk 
pooling arrange-ment (Zhao et al. 2013). Each option 
offers different exposure and security investment 
efficiency. A proportional hazard model demonstrates 
that vendors that provide both on-premises and cloud-
based services invest more in on-premises security than 
security providers based only in the cloud (August et al. 
2014). 
Information security standards are developed 
through inter-organizational collaboration. A case study 
about BS7799 -- the first security standard proposed by 
the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) -- 
extended the circuits of power framework [27] to 
examine human, economic, and social factors 
influencing this standard’s development (Backhouse et 
al. 2006). Because consensus was required, the standard 
was heavily influenced by organizations with extensive 
political capital -- more so than by economic or strategic 
incentives. A New South Wales agencies’ mandatory 
adoption of ISO InfoSec standard 27001:2006 (Smith et 
al. 2010) was reportedly influenced by the perceived 
legitimacy of the central government and compatibility 
of the standard with existing work practices. Limited 
resources, low senior management involvement, group 
norms, and cultural biases inhibited adoption. In 
general, research indicates that effective inter-
organizational information-sharing and collaboration 
help improve information security. However network 
traffic data from an ACM Special Interest Group reveals 
that joining a non-profit consortium is impractical for 
many organizations, due to high start-up costs, inability 
to reach economies of scale, transparency issues, and 
other factors (Gupta and Zhdanov 2012). 
Managerially-focused InfoSec research has yielded 
useful findings for the CIO and boards of directors. New 
techniques for estimating InfoSec risks can help the CIO 
justify investments in protective tools and resources 
(and the CIO needs to continually re-evaluate the 
organization’s level of protection). Managerially-
focused studies also reveal how varied contexts (within 
or beyond organizational boundaries) influence InfoSec 
policies and their effectiveness. Unfortunately, no silver 
bullet protects organizations. The CIO needs to ensure 
that complementary tools, policies, procedures, and 
human, financial, and technical resources are in place; 
that every element is effective; and that the organization 
has neither under- nor over-invested in redundant 
InfoSec protection. The board needs to ensure that other 
C-level executives understand how correlated security 
failures arise and why inter-organizational collaboration 
is needed, as well as the vital importance of employee 
training, participation, and vigilance. A team effort is 
needed to achieve and sustain a system of effective 
internal controls and rewards and to instill a culture of 
accountability and shared respect for the confidentiality, 
integrity and controlled availability of IS resources. 
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 6. Discussion 
 
     Boards of directors need to work closely with the 
CIO to ensure the security of organizational systems and 
data. They can start by asking two key questions (similar 
to those suggested by Nolan and McFarlan [9]):  
 
 How strong is our InfoSec prevention?   
 Are we prepared for incidents that will surely 
occur, and do our employees and partners know 
what to do when an InfoSec incident does occur? 
 
Most papers in our ten-year review set, (71 of 91 papers) 
focused on preventing InfoSec incidents by establishing 
policies, incentives, and sanctions to induce employees 
to comply with safe computing practices. However, 
InfoSec incidents continue to occur on a daily basis 
(including breaches that compromise personally 
identifiable information and threaten organizations’ 
reputation and financial standing). Thus, preventive 
InfoSec controls cannot as yet be considered reliable. 
Therefore, more research is needed that examines (and 
produces findings that ultimately improve) InfoSec 
incident preparation, detection and response. Ten 
studies in our review set examined technical, human, 
and/or economic InfoSec incident detection challenges. 
Two studies took a helpful managerial approach which 
we label “holistic”. Just one study (Njenga and Brown 
2012) actually examined incident response.  
     Thus, two broad topics have been understudied by IS 
researchers (at least, in the AIS Senior Scholars Basket): 
 
 InfoSec Incident Preparation (recognize InfoSec 
incidents will likely occur despite preventive 
controls; establish an incident response team and 
put a viable incident response plan in place; educate 
employees on their roles during and immediately 
following incidents; rehearse responses) 
 InfoSec Incident Response (ensure that employees 
and business partners adhere to the incident 
response plan and improvise appropriately)  
 
These topics are of great concern to boards of directors, 
particularly given risks – such as lost market value, lost 
customer trust, and embarrassment – that accompany 
large-scale breaches. Certainly the Target breach, and 
other recent high-profile incidents that led CIOs to lose 
their jobs, are important cautionary tales. Business-
research partnerships that foster more studies on 
preparation and response are greatly needed. 
Practitioners are also invited to approve or sponsor 
case studies and other interactive forms of InfoSec 
research. Considering the 91 papers in our review set in 
light of research methods used (Appendix 1), we see that 
although many attitude surveys were conducted and 
many econometric models were built, only eight case 
studies were conducted. Longitudinal case studies can 
help reveal how employee or business partner InfoSec 
compliance or non-compliance changes over time, and 
can also continue to explore how varied cultural and 
work contexts affect organizations’ vulnerability to 
breaches. Comparative case studies might reveal how 
various combinations of penalties, rewards, and 
education play out in organizations of varying sizes in 
various industries, populated by employees with 
different educational and skill levels, and other 
dimensions. More importantly, given the topical 
imbalance just observed, new case studies need to 
closely examine whether and how organizations prepare 
for and respond to InfoSec incidents, and to what extent 
members of formal incident response teams, and others 
in and beyond the organization, work effectively to 
protect resources and preserve valuable relationships 
with customers and business partners. This under-
studied subject is in need of immediate attention. 
A handful of action research InfoSec studies were 
published in our review set, along with 12 design 
science studies. Interactive research methods such as 
these help to ensure that studies are relevant and produce 
useful tools that IS organizations, employees, and 
managers can put to use. Perhaps it is time for a new 
group of interactive researchers to focus on incident 
preparation and response, which are not yet represented 
in this set of action research and design science studies. 
We conclude that, while existing behavioral, 
economic and technical scholars may prefer to continue 
on the research journeys they have already embarked 
upon, there is ample space for qualitative scholars 
(especially case researchers) and interactive scholars 
(those who excel at action research or design science) to 
investigate InfoSec incident preparation and response, 
and to offer valuable findings that the CIO and the 
Board of Directors can put to good use. Thus, research 
arising from new researcher-industry partnerships 
(which are often sponsored by CIOs and/or executive-
level industry leaders) might benefit greatly from a 
focus on InfoSec incident preparation and response, 
using case studies or interactive research methods.  
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APPENDIX 1 InfoSec Studies in the Basket: Partial Citations and Description 
Author/s Journal Year Method 
Primary 
Perspective 
Primary 
Aim 
Abbasi et al. MISQ 2010 DS+MOD+EXP Technical Detect 
Anderson and Agarwal MISQ 2010 SURV+EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Arora et al. ISR 2010 QUANT Managerial Prevent 
August and Tunca ISR 2008 MOD Managerial Prevent 
August et al. ISR 2014 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Backhouse et al. MISQ 2006 CASE Managerial Prevent 
Boss et al. EJIS 2009 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Bulgurcu et al. MISQ 2010 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Cavusoglu et al. ISR 2005 MOD Technical Detect 
Cavusoglu et al. JMIS 2008 MOD Technical Prevent 
Cavusoglu et al. ISR 2009 DS+MOD Technical Detect 
Chen et al. JMIS 2012 EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Chen, et al. MISQ 2011 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Cremonini and Nizovtsev JMIS 2009 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Culnan and Williams MISQ 2009 CASE Managerial Prevent 
D’Arcy et al. ISR 2009 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
D’Arcy, Herath, Shoss JMIS 2014 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
D’Aubeterre et al. EJIS 2008(b) DS+MOD Technical Prevent 
D'Aubeterre et al. JAIS 2008(a) DS+MOD Technical Prevent 
Dey et al. JMIS 2012 MOD Economic Prevent 
Dhillon and Torkzsedeh ISJ 2006 QUAL Managerial Holistic 
Dinev and Hu JAIS 2007 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Dinev et al. ISJ 2009 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Fernandez-Medina, et al. EJIS 2007 DS Technical Detect 
Galbreth and Shor MISQ 2010 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Gal-Or & Ghose ISR 2005 MOD Managerial Prepare 
Garfinkel et al. ISR 2007 DS+MOD Technical Prevent 
Goel and Chengalur-Smith JSIS 2010 SURV+QUAL  Managerial Prevent 
Goldstein et al. JAIS 2011 QUANT  Managerial Impacts 
Gordon et al. MISQ 2010 QUANT Managerial Impacts 
Guo et al. JMIS 2011 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
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 Gupta and Zhdanov MISQ 2012 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Hedstrom et al. JSIS 2011 CASE Behavioral Prevent 
Herath and Herath JMIS 2008 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Herath and Rao EJIS 2009 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Herath et al. ISJ 2014 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Hsu EJIS 2009 CASE Managerial Prevent 
Hsu et al. ISR 2012 QUAL+SURV Managerial Prevent 
Hu et al. JSIS 2007 CASE Managerial Prevent 
Hua and Bapna JSIS 2013 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Hui et al. JMIS 2013 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Johnson JMIS 2008 QUANT Managerial Prevent 
Johnston and Warkentin MISQ 2010 SURV+EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Karjalainen and Siponen JAIS 2011 SURV Managerial Prevent 
Katos and Adams JSIS 2005 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Keith et al. JAIS 2009 EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Kim and Kim MISQ 2014 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Kumar et al. JMIS 2008 MOD Risk & Impacts Prevent 
Kwon and Johnson JMIS 2013 SURV Managerial Prevent 
Kwon and Johnson MISQ 2014 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Lee and Larsen EJIS 2009 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Lee et al. ISR 2013 MOD Managerial Prevent 
Li & Sarkar ISR 2006 DS+MOD Technical Prevent 
Li and Sarkar ISR 2011 DS+MOD Technical Prevent 
Li and Sarkar MISQ 2014 DS+MOD Technical Prevent 
Li et al. ISJ 2014 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Liang and Xue JAIS 2010 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Liang et al. ISR 2014 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Melville and McQuaid ISR 2012 DS+MOD Technical Prevent 
Mookerjee et al. ISR 2011 MOD Managerial Detect 
Myyry et al. EJIS 2009 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Njenga and Brown EJIS 2012 CASE Managerial Respond 
Oetzel and Spiekermann EJIS 2014 MOD Technical Prevent 
Png and Wang JMIS 2009 MOD Economic Prevent 
Png et al JMIS 2008 MOD Economic Prevent 
Posey et al. MISQ 2013 QUAL+ SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Puhakainen and Siponen MISQ 2010 AR+SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Ransbotham and Mitra ISR 2009 QUAL+QUANT Managerial Detect 
Ransbotham et al. MISQ 2012 QUANT Economic Detect 
Salmela JIT 2008 AR Managerial Impacts 
Siponen and Vance MISQ 2010 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Siponen et al. JAIS 2006 DS+AR Technical Prevent 
Smith et al. MISQ 2010 AR+SURV Managerial Prevent 
Spears and Barki MISQ 2010 QUAL+SURV Managerial Prevent 
Stahl et al. ISJ 2012 CASE Managerial Prevent 
Sun et al. JMIS 2006 AR Managerial Impacts 
Temizkan et al. JMIS 2012 QUANT Managerial Prevent 
Tow et al. JIT 2010 QUAL+SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Vaast JSIS 2007 CASE Managerial Holistic 
Vance et al JAIS 2014 SURV+EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Vance et al. JMIS 2013 SURV Behavioral Detect 
Wang et al. ISR 2008 QUAL+MOD Managerial Prevent 
Wang et al. ISR 2013 EXP+QUAL Managerial Prevent 
Warkentin et al. EJIS 2011 SURV Behavioral Prevent 
Wong et al. ISJ 2012 DS+MOD+EXP Technical Detect 
Wright and Marett JMIS 2010 EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Wright et al. ISR 2014 EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Yayla & Hu JIT 2011 QUANT Managerial Impacts 
Yue and Cakanyildirim JMIS 2007 MOD Technical Detect 
Zhang et al. EJIS 2009 EXP Behavioral Prevent 
Zhao et al. JMIS 2013 MOD Managerial Impacts 
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